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Abstract
We conduct a large-scale eld experiment with 2,440 subjects in which
we exogenously vary the price of contributing to the closest empirical
counterpart of an innitely large public good, climate change mitigation.
We nd that the price e¤ect is robust and negative, but quantitatively
weak, with a price elasticity of  0:25. Socioeconomic variables such as
education, situational variables such as meteorological conditions around
the time of the experiment, and attitudinal variables that can be linked
to guilt and moral responsibility dominate the price e¤ect. The latter also
explain better than price arbitrage the decision of subjects to declare to be
eld price censored. The results provide an experimental window on the
absolute and relative role of price e¤ects on public goods contributions in
a large economy and inform current attempts to build a coherent theory
of charitable giving.
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1 Introduction
Better understanding voluntary contributions to large-scale public goods has
attracted considerable research e¤orts over recent years. One key area of interest
has been the question whether and how prices matter relative to other factors
such as donor characteristics or donor attitudes in the private provision of public
goods (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2008, Karlan and List 2007, Peloza and Steel
2005, Kingma 2007). An awareness of the absolute and relative role of prices
in the private provision of public goods is important for a number of reasons.
Fundraising practitioners and policy-makers require a clear understanding of
the role of prices as they construct fundraising and taxation schemes that may
involve matching grants, rebate subsidies, or more exotic instruments in order
to mobilize contributions (Eckel and Grossman 2008, Morgan 2000). To the
economist, it is important for helping to decide what the building blocks of a
more comprehensive theory of voluntary contributions would have to deliver
(Konow 2010, Andreoni 2006).
In order to improve our understanding of the voluntary provision of public
goods, we carry out a large-scale eld experiment1 on private contributions in
a very large public goods game. Its design enables us to clarify, in a real-world
setting, the absolute and relative role of prices in explaining whether subjects
choose to contribute. Previous papers employing a eld setting (Karlan and
List 2007, Karlan, List and Shar 2011, Eckel and Grossman 2008, Eckel and
Grossman 2003) have explored the role of prices by manipulating match ratios
and rebate rates. Both instruments can be used to reduce the e¤ective price
of public goods provisions below the eld price outside the experiment in a
controlled fashion. This strategy allows not only to understand the e¤ects of
common fundraising methods. Researchers also use it to triangulate experimen-
tal results with econometric evidence from tax rebate schemes (e.g. Peloza and
Steel 2005, Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter 2002). One drawback of the strategy is
that the design forces the researcher to adopt an indirect route to price variation:
Subjects do not observe di¤erent prices, but contribution multipliers. Interpret-
ing results derived by this route as those of an equivalent price change may or
may not be valid. A second drawback is directional asymmetry with respect
to price: A design based on matching or rebate instruments can only generate
observations for e¤ective prices of contributions below, and not above, the eld
price. This directional asymmetry may impose undesirable limits both for dis-
criminating between theoretical approaches and for addressing policy-relevant
issues.
In this paper, we follow the direct line of attack on the price e¤ect charted
by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002): These
authors exogenously vary the price of charitable behavior, specically the price
of benet sharing in a dictator game. There are important benets to this
direct assault on the price issue: In contrast to matching grants and rebates,
di¤erent subjects do indeed observe di¤erent prices in a clear and unambiguous
way, thus enhancing experimenter control over the price treatment. It also
generates observable behavior over a wider price range, including above a eld
1Following the nomenclature in List (2004), the present research strategy represents an
in-between case of framed and natural eld experiments. Our design falls short of a natural
eld experiment by virtue of the setting, which is familiar, but not natural, and by virtue of
the awareness by subjects that their choices are being observed by an experimenter.
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price. Moving the strategy of direct price variation from the laboratory setting
of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) into the eld, however, gives rise to a number
of challenges, among them the possibility of eld price censoring (FPC). The
solution adopted here is to combine direct experimenter control over price with
FPC detection methods originally developed in the context of non-market goods
valuation (Harrison, Lau and Williams 2002) in order to shed more light on the
price e¤ect in voluntary giving.
In addition to understanding the absolute role of price for whether individu-
als contribute privately to large-scale public goods, the design also provides an
opportunity to study the role of price relative to other determinants. There is a
lively debate about what drives individual contribution decisions. Drivers dis-
cussed in the literature include socioeconomic determinants such as age (e.g. List
2004), gender (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), and education (e.g. Karlan
2005). But also attitudinal and psychological factors such as image motivation
(e.g. Benabou and Tirole 2006), guilt (e.g. Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007),
or o¤set motives (Kotchen 2009) have received attention. The experiment we
conduct speaks to this debate by exploiting observable characteristics of indi-
vidual subjects in several of these dimensions and linking them to a subjects
contribution choice.
We use a large-scale eld experiment in which subjects have a single choice
between a given cash prize and a contribution to a very large-scale public good.
The cash prize on o¤er is the outcome of a random draw from a range of e2 to
e100. The public goods contribution that subjects can make is a xed amount
of climate change mitigation e¤orts in the form of an emissions reduction of
one ton of CO2, carried out through the documented retirement of emissions
allowances (EUA) under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-
ETS). Climate change mitigation is not only highly policy relevant, it also ar-
guably provides (see e.g. Nordhaus 1993) the closest empirical counterpart to
the theoretical analysis of innitely large public goods games initiated by An-
dreoni (1988). The single choice format of the experiment reects our focus
on the extensive margin of contribution (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian 1986):
Subjects only choose whether to contribute or not, given the alternative of a
cash prize. Fieldrefers to several features of the experimental design, namely
a subject sample that polling companies take as representative for the popula-
tion of German voters, a familiar, non-laboratory environment in which subjects
take their decision, and the use of subjectsinformation set as they bring it to
the task (Harrison and List 2004). Large-scalerefers to the sample of 2,440
subjects that participated in the experiment.
Our key results can be summarized as follows. In absolute terms, the price
e¤ect is present, but small. Positive variations in the price of providing the pub-
lic good do have the predicted negative impact on the propensity to contribute
(Andreoni and Miller 2002): At the individual level, the marginal e¤ect of a
e1 increase in the price of the contribution decreases the probability that the
individual will contribute by around 0.1 percent. At the aggregate level, the
price elasticity of the extensive margin is  0:25. The price e¤ect is therefore
small, whether measured at the individual or the aggregate level. The point
estimates of low price elasticity of contributing to public goods by Karlan and
List (2007) and Eckel and Grossman (2008) are therefore part of a more general
phenomenon that holds at higher degrees of resolution and over a wider price
range.
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In relative terms, our evidence supports the notion that, compared to price,
other variables have more power in explaining the observed contribution deci-
sions in a very large economy. Among socioeconomic variables, we fail to conrm
previous ndings that gender or age correlate with contribution decisions, but
we nd that education stands out. Our ndings also conrm recent results on
situational or moodfactors driving contribution decisions (Konow 2010, Kirch-
steiger, Rigotti and Rustichini 2006): Meteorological conditions such as ambient
temperature at the time of the experiment appear to inuence the probabil-
ity of contributing. Extending the analysis towards attitudinal variables that
have been raised in the context of non-price determinants of public goods con-
tribution such as moral satisfaction (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), warm
glow (Andreoni 1990), o¤sets (Kotchen 2009), or guilt avoidance (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg 2007), we nd that contributions are positively associated both
with a perception of next-generation benets and personal benets and with an
acknowledgement of previous negative contributions to the public good. Atti-
tudinal variables, e.g. shame avoidance (Andreoni and Petrie 2004), are also
better able than price variables to explain the evidence generated by a test for
FPC.
The paper proceeds as follows: We explain the experimental design con-
siderations, the experimental protocol, and the nature of the sample in detail
in the following section. We then present the experimental results and their
econometric analysis in section 3 before interpreting and discussing the results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Basic design and protocol
Economists have long noted that voluntary emissions reductions to mitigate
climate change constitute the closest empirical counterpart to a contribution
in an innitely large public goods game (e.g. Nordhaus 1993). We embrace
this feature in the design of our eld experiment by o¤ering 2,440 subjects a
choice between, on the one hand, a cash award and, on the other, a guaranteed
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction of 1 ton of CO2. The choices are
then implemented under a random incentive system (Grether and Plott 1979,
Starmer and Sugden 1991, Lee 2008). The cash prize presented to the subject
is the outcome of an equiprobable draw from prizes between e2 and e100 in
steps of e2. The GHG emissions reduction is in the form of the documented
and veriable retirement of an emissions allowance under the EU-ETS.2 The
random incentive system is between-subjects (Baltussen, Post, Van den Assem
and Wakker 2010, Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido and Wakker 2011, Tversky and
Kahneman 1981) with odds of one in fty that the subjects choice of either
2The European Unions Emissions Trading System regulates industrial CO2 emissions
across all EU member states. Emitters can trade in units of EUAs, EU emissions allowances,
each corresponding to one metric ton of CO2. Total emissions for the trading period 2008-12,
the relevant one for this experiment, are capped at 1.856 billion tons. The total ceiling is
binding and enforced. ETS account holders will typically trade EUAs, but can also purchase
and delete (retire) an EUA. This lowers the total ceiling, and hence emissions, by one ton.
Each EUA is uniquely identied by its issue number and hence traceable for both experimenter
and subject. EUAs, however, are not paper currency and have therefore no curiosity value as
a tangible private commodity.
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cash or emissions reductions is realized.3 Subjects do not learn about others
choices before, during, or after the experiment.
In order to retain a narrow focus on the public good dimensions of the
contribution, the design excludes to the greatest extent possible confounding
public or private goods aspects associated with the experiment. For example,
if subjects received EUA retirement certicates in hardcopy, it would plausibly
increase the willingness to contribute in order to purchase a good with a strong
curiosity dimension. Additional goods dimensions as well as the visibility of a
subjects contribution to others are therefore minimized.
Our subjects are drawn from the approximately 65,000 Internet panel mem-
bers of one of the largest polling companies in Germany4 and are representative
for the countrys Internet using population of voting age.5 The Internet experi-
ment ran in two sessions in May and July 2010.6 Session 1 lasted from May 25th
to June 2nd and generated 1,640 complete observations from 1,817 invitations.
Session 2 lasted from July 19th to 27th and generated 800 complete observa-
tions out of 888 invitations. The recruitment of subjects followed the standard
routine in which panel members are invited via an email message to proceed
to the poll via a hypertext link. In presentation, the poll was indistinguishable
from a standard poll run by the polling company: The introductory screen ex-
plained the thematic focus of the poll, the expected duration (ten minutes), and
the specics of the random incentive system. These design criteria would have
been familiar to panel members in format and content from previous polls as
they decided on whether to proceed. Following the invitation screen, there was
a lter screen to focus on German subjects.7 Participants then faced a sequence
of ten to thirteen computer screens during the experiment, depending on their
decisions.8
The centerpiece of the experimental design were two screens, the informa-
tion screen that set up and the decision screen that collected the subjects
choice. The information screen explained three features of the experiment, (1)
the choice between a cash prize in Euros and the CO2 emissions reduction, (2)
3Between-subjects (BS) and within-subject (WS) random incentives systems have been
subjected to examination for possible biases. While BS introduces noise, there is no evidence
of a systematic bias for simple tasks such as the dichotomous decision explored here (Baltussen
et al. 2010, Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden 1998, Bolle 1990).
4The polling company, YouGov, incentivizes panel members in each poll through either
a piece-rate reward of approximately e1 for 20 minutes expected survey time or random
(lottery) prizes, e.g. in the form of shopping vouchers in denominations of e25 or e50. All
cash awards accrue to the subjects personal account with the polling company. The random
incentive scheme was therefore procedurally familiar and with an average award of e50 and
an expected award of e1 comparable in monetary terms.
5We test whether our sample di¤ers from one drawn from the general population of Ger-
man voters. Using two-sided t -tests, we reject the hypothesis that the means of the socio-
demographic characteristics coincide at the one percent level. Our subjects are more likely
to be male, younger, and educated than the average German of voting age. Income is self-
reported, and therefore the lower average income in the sample is unsurprising.
6Prior to the experiment we ran a set of pre-tests and a pilot experiment with 200 economics
students at Heidelberg University to test the online implementation, rene the set of texts
and questions, and test the procedure that addresses eld-price censoring.
7Subjects of other nationalities were redirected to other surveys running at the same time.
Again, this is familiar to panel members as political polls often restrict the sample to those
eligible to vote.
8The screens required an answer for each question by entering text or choosing at least one
of the options given (including I dont know options) before being able to proceed to the
subsequent screen.
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a succinct explanation of how the deletion of an EUA reliably and veriably re-
duces EU CO2 emissions, and (3) an explanation of the random incentive system
with odds of 100 in every 5,000.9 Except for reminding subjects that emissions
reductions have the same e¤ect on climate change irrespective of the location
of the abatement activity, the experiment did not contain further material to
educate or inform experimental subjects. The observation that subjects of eld
experiments on public goods contributions are typically not very well informed
about and may di¤er signicantly in their assessment of the real impact of their
contribution on public goods provision also applies to this setting. The contri-
bution decisions observed are therefore based on knowledge that subjects bring
to the experiment.10
The decision screen explained how the subject would receive their chosen
prize if the subject was drawn as a winner.11 The screen then collected the
subjects choice, i.e. the specic cash award or the EUA, which were presented
on the screen in a randomized ordering.
Following the information and the decision screen, the experiment concluded
with a set of screens containing follow-up questions. Subjects that had chosen
the cash prize were automatically directed to a screen that provided subjects
with an non-incentivized opportunity to explain their choice. Subjects were
asked to (1) check whether the experimental cash prize was simply preferable
to the value they attached to the CO2 reduction, (2) check whether the given
cash prize was higher than their estimate of alternative CO2 reduction options
available, and (3) enter free text to explain the preference for the cash prize.
All subjects were then asked to provide estimates of the EUA price and their
availability to subjects outside the experiment. Another set of questions was
targeted at subjectsbeliefs about benets from todays emission reductions as
well as their perceived personal contribution to climate change. The survey
concluded with collecting specic socio-demographic information in addition to
subjects socio-demographic prole on record with the polling company.
2.2 Price Treatment
The central design feature of the experiment is the direct variation in the op-
portunity cost of contributing to the large-scale public good. Experience with
direct price variation in the lab comes from Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
and Andreoni and Miller (2002). These authors use a within-subject random
incentive system to examine how subjects behave in eight di¤erent economic
environments characterized by exogenous variations in the price of giving and
endowment. Employing a between-subjects random incentive system instead,
9Note that this representation of the odds could lead subjects to believe that at least 5,000
people participate in the poll. This is not misleading: This paper reports only on the baseline
share of 2,440 of the roughly 6,800 individual experiments carried out in total.
10O¤ering subjects potentially choice-relevant information prior or during the experiment
has been shown to lead to inevitable biases and potential misinterpretations (Arrow, Solow,
Portney, Leamer, Radner and Schuman 1993, Munro and Hanley 1999). Instead, the eld
nature of the experiment allows subjects to collect relevant information while the experiment
is in progress, something that the choice of the universal metric deliberately facilitates and
that we can indirectly observe.
11As in other polls by the polling company, all winners would be informed via a personal
email message. Cash prizes were directly credited to the members account. The retirement of
EUAs was individually and privately traceable and veriable by EUA issue number through
a public-sector Internet site.
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our eld design randomly assigns subjects to one of fty di¤erent experimental
prices. The prices range, in steps of e2 from e2 to e100, is roughly one order
of magnitude above and below the actual e15 eld price of an EUA at the time
of the experiment. The group size is on average 49 subjects per experimental
price12 . Neither the price randomization, the price range, nor the sample size are
communicated to the subjects. Subjects only learn their individual realization
of the random draw of a price and, after the experiment, whether or not their
decision is randomly selected for implementation from the pool of participants.
Important design considerations are the direction and strength of the price
e¤ect as well as the issue of potential eld price censoring that arises as a result
of taking the direct price variation from the lab into the eld.
2.2.1 The price e¤ect and the price elasticity of contributions
With a focus on the extensive margin of contributing in a large economy (Bergstrom
et al. 1986), the experimental design leads to clear theoretical predictions on the
presence and direction of the price e¤ect. Under standard assumptions, models
of pure altruism (Andreoni 1988), impure altruism (Andreoni 1990), and o¤set
(Kotchen 2009) predict that at a high price of giving, the probability that an
individual will contribute is lower than at a low price of giving. Similarly, a
conditional cooperation model of behavior would predict higher contributions
at lower prices if sophisticated subjects interpret cash prizes below their per-
ceived eld price of the public good as evidence of matching by the experimenter
as Karlan and List (2007) show.13 Conrming the thrust of these predictions,
Karlan and List (2007) nd a negative price e¤ect at the extensive margin of
contributing to a non-prot organization. Eckel and Grossman (2008), on the
other hand, do not identify a price e¤ect when examining the impact of o¤ering
subsidy rates on response rates of potential contributors in a eld experiment
on fund-raising for public radio.
While the presence and direction of the price e¤ect are mostly clear, theory
provides less guidance on its strength. There are a number of arguments, such
as lack of substitutes and salience of price in deciding on public goods contribu-
tions, that support the notion that the price elasticity for contributing to public
goods should be low (Green 1992). Also, both in a pure and impure altruism
model in the spirit of Andreoni (1988) and Andreoni (1990), respectively, the
subjects strategic interdependence in providing the public good reduces the
price elasticity of the Nash contributions as long as subjects believe that all
subjects face the same change in price. Support for predicting low price elastic-
ity comes from experimental studies that examine a limited number of discrete
price variations and report low estimates at the extensive margin of contribut-
ing: Smith, Kehoe and Cremer (1995) nd that the decision whether to make
a charitable contribution for a rural health care facility is insensitive to price.
Likewise, examining contribution choices for an unmatched baseline and three
match ratios, Karlan and List (2007) nd that while the probability of donating
12Standard deviation is 6.4. The smallest group consisted of 31, the largest of 66 subjects.
13The same authors also discuss that a broader class of models makes for more equivocal
predictions: For example, alternative predictions on price e¤ects arise in an indirect way
out of studies on quantity e¤ects in hypothetical valuation exercises on public goods. These
demonstrate that individuals stated values are insensitive to quantity (Baron and Greene
1996, Kahneman and Knetsch 1992), which gives rise to at least the theoretical possibility
that their revealed valuations may also be insensitive to price.
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responds to the presence of a match, the response is inelastic with respect to
the match ratios. Eckel and Grossman (2003) and Eckel and Grossman (2008)
on the other hand nd unit elasticity of a price match both in the eld and the
laboratory, but a much lower elasticity when using a rebate match.
By random assignment of subjects to one of fty experimental prices, both
the presence and direction of the price e¤ect as well as the price elasticity can be
studied at a higher degree of resolution and over a wider price range than eld
experiments that typically o¤er no more than four price variations below the
actual eld price. This allows us not only to test the robustness of our current
understanding of price e¤ects, but also to check whether the existing results can
truly be understood as point estimates of a continuous price e¤ect and whether
these insights also apply to variations above the eld price.
2.2.2 Field price censoring
The challenge created by the directly varying prices in the eld in order to
determine the price e¤ect is that of eld price censoring (FPC) (Harrison and
List 2004). FPC arises because prices for goods within the experiment are
di¢ cult to isolate from prices of those same goods or close substitutes in the
real world (Harrison et al. 2002, Harrison, Harstad and Rutström 2004, Cherry,
Frykblom, Shogren, List and Sullivan 2004). In other words, the experiment
exogenously introduces an arbitrage opportunity for subjects. As a result, the
experimentally observable contribution decision may be truncated at the level
of the subjects perceived eld price plus transaction costs.14 In the present
experiment, subjects may believe that they are able to provide an equivalent
CO2 emissions reduction at a lower total cost (including transaction costs) than
the prize o¤ered as an alternative, for example by avoiding unnecessary car
trips.
To detect FPC, we follow the strategy of a debrieng questionnaire (Coller
and Williams 1999, Harrison et al. 2002), which consists of the three FPC ques-
tions that follow the decision screen in the experimental protocol. The question-
naire functions as an ex post choice lter to detect subjects constrained by FPC
from revealing there true contribution decision. As a result, the FPC lter
contains all subjects that did not check the rst of the three questions (Was the
cash prize simply more valuable to you than the CO2 emissions reduction?),
but checked the second question (Do you think the given cash prize was higher
than the cost of alternative ways for you to reduce CO2 emissions?) or made
a qualitatively equivalent statement in response to question 3 (Did you have
other reasons for choosing the cash prize?).
Recoding those observations contained in the FPC lter as having chosen
the contribution at the given price is one strategy for correcting for eld price
censoring and delivers a candidate for the set of uncensored contributors. The
14For our purposes, FPC is present if a subject with a reservation price for the public goods
contribution ri accepts the experiment cash prize ei even though ri > ei simply because the
eld price of an equivalent contribution in the eld f^i estimated by the subject (inclusive of
transaction costs) obeys ei > f^i. In cases then where ri > ei > f^i, the experimenter may
mistakenly conclude that the unobservable reservation price ri is smaller than ei on the basis
of the subject choosing cash instead of the good and therefore systematically understate the
probability to contribute. Since there is no secondary market for retired EUAs, we need not
be concerned about the situation f^i > ei > ri in which subjects opt for the EUA despite
ri < ei in order to pocket the arbitrage margin f^i   ei:
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plausibility of this candidate depends, however, on the credibility of the FPC
lter. A common problem in debrieng methods of this type is that, while easily
implemented, the FPC lter is not immune to contamination through strategic
behavior or ex post rationalization (Corrigan and Rousu 2008). Subjects choos-
ing cash may declare to be eld price censored for self-serving reasons, e.g. in
order not to appear to be motivated by personal gain. We return to this point
in section 3.3.
3 Results and analysis
3.1 Experimental results
2,440 subjects completed the experiment with a median completion time of 5
minutes.15 A total of 382 subjects (15.7 percent) in the experiment chose the
public goods contribution, 2,058 opted for the cash prize.16 Figure 1 presents
the observations and tted shares of original contributors for each of the fty
price treatments. Looking at the extreme ends of the price range we nd on the
lower end that the average subject does not voluntarily contribute to the global
public good even at a minimal cost of donating. On the other hand, the share of
subjects contributing is clearly positive throughout and up to the upper bound
of e100, even though the contributions take place in a very large economy.17
The extensive margin of contribution decisions in gure 1 traces out a nega-
tively sloped, almost vertical contribution schedule. At the same time, the tell-
tale signs of eld price censoring such as a price that truncates contributions
are absent. Also, the price elasticity of the contribution schedule appears low at
rst sight. To conrm, we estimate the overall price elasticity of the contribution
schedule under a constant elasticity assumption. The estimated price elasticity
of  0:25 is lower than the empirical price elasticities estimated by Auten, Sieg
and Clotfelter (2002) for tax rebates on charitable donations and closer to the
eld experimental price elasticities of contribution decisions reported by Karlan
and List (2007) with  0:225 for matching grants and by Eckel and Grossman
(2008) with  0:11 for rebate subsidies.18
3.2 Econometric analysis
The econometric analysis of the subjectsdiscrete choices requires a number of
model and parametric assumptions. We employ a probit model to study the
15Average completion time was 1 hour 17 minutes. This is driven by a small fraction of
surveys (approx. 3%) in which subjects availed themselves of the opportunity to leave the
survey and continue hours or days later.
16The following results exclude the observations from those 83 subjects that expressed
disbelief about the payment and EUA vehicle in freetext options provided. On theoretical
grounds, we decided to exclude these observations, but the results are not sensitive to their
inclusion.
17A possible caveat regarding the share of contributors arises from our use of what has
variously been called found, windfall (Keeler et al. 1985) or house money (Clark 2002,
Harrison 2007). Since subjects are trading o¤ a contribution to a public good against income
that they did not earn themselves, there is a concern in the literature that this might bias re-
sults compared to a situation where subjects have to sacrice their own money. The literature
is divided, however, on the likely direction of the bias, if any.
18For matching grants, Eckel and Grossman (2008) nd a price elasticity of  1:045.
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Figure 1: Share of contributors for fty price treatments. The Figure plots the
cash prize o¤ered to subjects against the share of subjects choosing to contribute
at this price. Cash prizes are between e2 and e100, in steps of e2. Plotted is
the linear tted regression line (n=2,357).
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impact of price and non-price variables on the likelihood of contributing. We
estimate two basic specications:
Yi = 0 + 1Pi + "i (1)
Yi = 0 + 1Pi + 2Ni + 3Pini + "i (2)
with Yi denoting a binary variable with Yi = 1 if subject i chose the contri-
bution and Pi denoting the cash prize o¤ered to subject i while Ni and ni are
vectors of the subjects non-price attributes with ni representing a subset of Ni.
The rst model is an unconditional model of the price e¤ect on the extensive
margin of contributing based on the fty price treatments. This model gives
the price e¤ect and has the additional benet of allowing a direct comparison
to similar unconditional models such as that of Karlan and List (2007). The
second model combines both price and non-price e¤ects and allows for variants
that examine specic interaction terms between price and non-price variables.
The non-price variables considered in the estimation comprise a range of
socio-demographic attributes of the subject available through the polling com-
pany (age, gender, income, education, residence) and attitudinal attributes spe-
cic to the public good (beliefs in benets, familiarity). The nature of the
Internet experiment also allows us to observe when exactly subjects completed
the experiment and how much time subjects spent at each screen. Finally, we
combine the experimental dataset with environmental controls connected to the
experiment such as media presence of the public good around the time of the ex-
periment based on media data (LexisNexis) and regional temperature data from
the National Weather Service (DWD). Table 1 reports the summary statistics
of the sample variables.
Table 2 reports the results of the maximum likelihood (ML) probit regres-
sions of both models. Column 1 corresponds to model 1. The following columns
provide variants of model 2 with alternative specications, focusing on the im-
portant results discussed below. The complete results that include xed e¤ects
estimates can be found in the appendix and conrm the robustness of coe¢ -
cient estimates and signicance levels across specications. The remainder of
the section covers the results on the individual price and non-price determinants
to arise out of the di¤erent specications.
3.2.1 Price e¤ects
The rst result is that price matters: Converting probit coe¢ cient estimates of
the experimental price (cash prize) into marginal e¤ects (table 3), we nd that
a price increase of e1 at the sample mean decreases the propensity to choose
the EUA retirement by approximately 0:1 percent. The e¤ect therefore has the
desired negative sign, is signicant at the one percent level and robust across
specications. At the same time, price does not matter substantially. A one
Euro increase shifts an average of about 2.4 subjects from contributing to not
contributing. This means that while there are subjects populating the margin,
they are few. The robustness across specications means that the magnitude of
the price e¤ect changes only slightly when allowing for both price and non-price
e¤ects in model 2.
The result on the presence and statistical relevance of the price e¤ect is in
line with the clear predictions of standard theories of private contributions to
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Description Mean S.d. Obs.
Socio-demographic characteristics
Female Indicator variable for gender, 1 if
female
0.470 0.499 2,357
Age Age of subject (years) 45.42 14.68 2,355
Years of education Based on subjects stated highest
educational degree
12.28 3.217 2,302
Income Midpointa of subjects reported
monthly net income category (Eu-
ros)
2,557 1,709 1,953
Environmental controls
Ambient temperature Mean temperature in subjects re-
gion of residence before subject
started experimentb (C)
15.1 4.189 2,303
Media attention Number of hits for a climate
change related keyword searchc in
German print and online media be-
fore subject started experimentb
136.9 28.12 2,303
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
Personal benets Believes in personal benets
from e¤ects of carbon emissions
reductionsd
2.365 0.990 2,098
Future benets Believes in benets for following
generations from todays emissions
reductionsd
2.899 0.969 2,115
Negative contributions Believes that personal lifestyle has
contributed to climate changed
2.758 0.952 2,094
Footprint estimate Estimate of yearly CO2 emissions
from lifestyle (tons)
3,017e 15,330 2,357
Footprint condence Condence in the footprint esti-
mate given, 1 if at least rather
sure
0.074 0.262 2,357
EUA price estimate Estimate of the spot price of EU
emissions allowances
1,652 10,300 2,357
EUA price condence Condence in the price estimate
given, 1 if at least rather sure
0.106 0.308 2,357
EUA availability Believes EUAs would be available
for purchase by private individuals
(1 if at least rather yes)
0.197 0.398 2,357
Notes: a In our income approximation, for the less than e 500category, we assume e 450.
For the two categories above e 5,000, we assume e 8,000 for compatibility with German census
data. The remaining categories have widths of e 500. b Average of the daily values of the
day of the experiment and the day before c Keywords used: climate change, climate
protection, global warming, carbon dioxide, CO2 d 1=no, 2=rather no, 3=rather
yes, 4=yes e Median is 10
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Table 2: Probit coe¢ cient estimates
Model 1 Variants of model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash prize -0.0038*** -0.0040*** -0.0048*** -0.0056***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Demographics
Female  0.1018 0.0435 0.0390
(0.074) (0.084) (0.085)
Age  0.0035 0.0032 0.0034
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of education  0.0594*** 0.0551*** 0.0609***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Net income (Te)  -0.0133 -0.0188 -0.0135
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
Environmental controls
Ambient temperature   0.0202** 0.0219**
(0.009) (0.009)
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
Personal benets   0.1625*** 0.1900***
(0.056) (0.057)
Future benets   0.2248*** 0.2179***
(0.063) (0.065)
Negative contributions   0.1714*** 0.1934***
(0.055) (0.058)
Footprint estimate (Tt)   -0.0028 -0.0030
(0.003) (0.003)
Footprint condence   -0.6510*** 0.7308
(0.181) (0.627)
EUA price estimate (Te)   0.0058* 0.0059*
(0.003) (0.003)
EUA price condence   0.2727** 0.2761**
(0.134) (0.136)
EUA availability   -0.0818 -0.0832
(0.096) (0.096)
Survey completion time   0.0005 0.0007
(0.001) (0.001)
Interaction terms
Cashprize *    0.0014***
years of education (0.000)
Cashprize *    0.0028
personal benets (0.002)
Cashprize *    -0.0013
future benets (0.002)
Cashprize *    -0.0001
negative contributions (0.002)
Cashprize *    -0.0066
footprint condence (0.007)
Cashprize *    -0.0007
EUA price condence (0.005)
Footprint condence *    -0.4302**
negative contributions (0.194)
Footprint condence *    -0.0001
footprint estimate (0.000)
EUA price condence *    -0.0950
EUA price estimate (0.303)
Constant -0.7965*** -1.7152*** -3.4114*** -1.5418***
(0.061) (0.195) (0.314) (0.227)
N 2357.000 1920.000 1600.000 1600.000
Log-likelihood -1038.039 -821.496 -650.457 -639.513
2 12.635 44.678 179.905 201.792
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.026 0.121 0.136
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if sub ject chose the contribution over the cash award.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** Signicant at or below 1 percent ** Signif-
icant at or below 5 percent * Signicant at or below 10 percent
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Table 3: Marginal e¤ects
Model 1 Variants of model 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash prize -0.0009*** -0.0009*** -0.0011*** -0.0012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Demographics
Female (d)  0.0243 0.0098 0.0084
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Age  0.0008 0.0007 0.0007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education  0.0141*** 0.0124*** 0.0132***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Net income (Te)  -0.0032 -0.0042 -0.0029
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Environmental controls
Ambient temperature   0.0045** 0.0047**
(0.002) (0.002)
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
Personal benets   0.0364*** 0.0411***
(0.012) (0.012)
Future benets   0.0504*** 0.0471***
(0.014) (0.014)
Negative contributions   0.0384*** 0.0418***
(0.012) (0.012)
Footprint estimate (Tt)   -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.001)
Footprint condence (d)   -0.1064*** 0.2100
(0.020) (0.220)
EUA price estimate (Te)   0.0013* 0.0013*
(0.001) (0.001)
EUA price condence (d)   0.0681* 0.0668*
(0.037) (0.036)
EUA availability (d)   -0.0179 -0.0175
(0.020) (0.020)
Survey completion time   0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Interaction terms
Cashprize *    0.0003***
years of education (0.000)
Cashprize *    0.0006
personal benets (0.000)
Cashprize *    -0.0003
future benets (0.000)
Cashprize *    -0.0000
negative contributions (0.000)
Cashprize *    -0.0014
footprint condence (0.001)
Cashprize *    -0.0001
EUA price condence (0.001)
Footprint condence *    -0.0930**
negative contributions (0.042)
Footprint condence *    -0.0000
footprint estimate (0.000)
EUA price condence *    -0.0206
EUA price estimate (0.065)
N 2357.000 1920.000 1600.000 1600.000
Log-likelihood -1038.039 -821.496 -650.457 -639.513
2 12.635 44.678 179.905 201.792
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.026 0.121 0.136
Notes: Marginal e¤ects evaluated at the sample means. (d) denotes the marginal
e¤ect of an indicator variable. Dependent variable: 1 if sub ject chose the contribution
over the cash award. Standard errors in parentheses. *** Signicant at or below 1
percent ** Signicant at or below 5 percent * Signicant at or below 10 percent
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public goods (Bergstrom et al. 1986, Andreoni 1990): At the extensive margin of
whether to contribute or not, a higher price of donating decreases the probability
of contributing. In this, our ndings provide further conrmation of the eld
results by Karlan and List (2007). They nd a signicant price e¤ect at the
extensive margin by introducing a match (i.e. reducing the cost of contribution
below the eld price), but no e¤ect through step-wise variations in the match.
In this point, our ndings di¤er: When allowing for non-linearities, we nd the
most signicant and largest e¤ect of price on the contribution decision at low
prices, especially below the eld price.19 .
Overall the price e¤ect is small and recalls previous results on the price elas-
ticity of demand for public goods (e.g. Green 1993). One argument is that in de-
cisions about public goods, in particular political or charitable goods, non-price
factors such as moral and ethical considerations may dominate price considera-
tion. We examine a number of plausible proxies for these considerations in the
following section on non-price e¤ects. Another argument is that the insensitivity
with respect to price is the result of possible confounding e¤ects of experimental
prices on valuation when subjects are poorly informed or unfamiliar with the
good (Green 1992, List and Jason 1999): Higher prices o¤ered might conceivably
lead uninformed subjects to infer that the good is more valuable. To test for
the possibility of a confounding price e¤ect, we re-estimate the model with in-
teraction terms between price and variables that are likely to be associated with
greater familiarity with the good such as subjectscondence in their knowledge
about the donation context (condence in own carbon footprint estimate, con-
dence in EUA price estimate) and their education. A confounding e¤ect would
mean that better informed subjects should be more price sensitive compared to
less informed subjects, who would be more likely to base their valuation of the
contribution on the cash prize o¤ered in the lottery. We nd either no or a posi-
tive relationship between the propensity to provide the mitigation e¤ort and the
information-weightedprice (see column 4 in tables 2 and 3): Contrary to the
hypothesis of the confounding price e¤ect, more familiarity does not change the
price elasticity of contributing or decreases it. This resonates with experimen-
tal ndings that price elasticity does not systematically vary with uncertainty
about good characteristics (He¤etz and Shaya 2009).
3.2.2 Non-price e¤ects
The non-price variables that can be considered as possible drivers of the con-
tribution decision fall into two categories. One set of variables consists of char-
acteristics that are truly exogenous to the experiment. These are subjects
socio-demographic attributes such as education, gender, and age as well as
the environmental controls that inform the experimenter about the time and
likely place of the subjects participation. The published literature allows us
to compare and contrast our ndings with those in other laboratory and eld
experiments in which data on these characteristics have been collected.
The other set of variables, e.g. benets and negative contributions, consists
of characteristics that are based on subjectsstatements elicited after the con-
tribution decision and, for those choosing the cash prize, after explaining their
choice. These variables provide an opportunity to give experimental traction
19Estimation results are available upon request.
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to some of the more recent attempts to understand psychological drivers of
contributions. Subjectsperception of benets of their contribution to future
generations or their assessment of own previous negative contributions to the
public good can be plausibly linked to motives of altruism or a sense of moral
responsibility. However, observations based on statements made ex post are
inherently problematic as subjects may answer not only truthfully, but also
strategically. As a result, the relevant results need to be interpreted cautiously.
Demographics Subjectsproles on record with the polling company provide
the bulk of socioeconomic data on the subject sample. As an aggregate, the
sample is representative for the population and yet allows linking contribution
decisions to a subjects age, gender, income, and education on an individual
basis. All four socioeconomic dimensions have received some attention in the
literature so far. List (2004) succinctly sums up experimental evidence on the
socioeconomic drivers of a failure to contribute in public goods games through
his dictum of young, selsh, and male.
Gender di¤erences with respect to social preferences have attracted a great
deal of attention in the past. In a recent review of the literature, Croson and
Gneezy (2009) report that the behavioral salience of gender in areas such as
risk taking or competition is well understood by now. The evidence that gender
di¤ererences are present in public goods settings, however, is less clear-cut (see
Croson and Gneezy 2009 and references therein). Also, Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001) point to the possible subtleties in examining the impact of gender on
behavior in social dilemmas: In a laboratory setting, they nd male subjects to
be more altruistic than female subjects when the price of giving is low, and vice
versa.
The regression results of table 2 report on the presence of a simple shift e¤ect
of gender on the probability of contributing. The estimated coe¢ cient for female
gender is positive, but never signicant. Following the ndings by Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001), we also test for a possible price-gender interaction term
to allow for elasticities to di¤er between men and women and again nd no
evidence for a gender e¤ect in the present setting. Taken together, these results
strengthen the currently equivocal evidence on gender e¤ects in public goods
settings.
Along gender e¤ects, age has also started to attract some attention as a
determinant of behavior in public goods settings (List 2004, Harbaugh and
Krause 2000). List (2004) and Carpenter, Connolly and Myers (2008), for ex-
ample, nd that social preferences increase with age in laboratory public good
games and charitable donations experiments. The specics of our eld exper-
iment, however, provide reasons for expecting a positive age e¤ect to be tem-
pered, neutralized, or even reversed. Well-informed subjects may reason that
due to the inertia of the climate system, contributions today create public goods
far in the future, three to ve decades from now. Subjects and their cohort are
therefore less likely to benet the older they are today. The net e¤ect of a
possible age-induced strengthening of social preferences on the one hand and an
age-related decrease in personal benets from GHG emissions reductions on the
other is unclear ex ante.
To test how subjects view the intertemporal nature of the public good we
include interaction terms of age with perceptions of personal or next generation
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benets from mitigation e¤orts but fail to establish a signicant non-linear e¤ect
of age.20 Overall, there is no evidence that age inuences the probability of
contributing in our experiment, as tables 2 and 3 show. While positive, the
coe¢ cient estimate fails signicance tests even at the 10 percent level.
The e¤ect of income is insignicant in every model specication.21 While
surprising in the context of the tax rebate literature (Auten et al. 2002), income
elasticities of contribution close to zero have also been reported in a eld ex-
periment on charitable contributions by Eckel and Grossman (2008). However,
the authors warn against overinterpreting the result due to data limitations. In
the present experiment, income data is indeed available on an individual level.
While this strengthens the plausibility of the results, caution is advised as in-
come is self-reported and therefore subject to potential biases and reporting is
somewhat incomplete.
Among otherwise inconclusive socioeconomic determinants, education stands
out as highly signicant across all specications. As the results on marginal
e¤ects in table 3 show, subjectspropensity to contribute increases by as much as
one percent for a every year spent in education. Both the presence and strength
of the education e¤ect are interesting. Many papers studying charitable behavior
do not report on the educational status of participants. Notable exceptions are
List (2004) and Karlan (2005): In three eld experiments measuring social
preferences reported by List (2004), education is either insignicant or weakly
associated with higher contributions. On the other hand, in an experimental
study in the context of a Peruvian microcredit program, Karlan (2005) nds
that educational attainment is a determinant of observed behavior in a number
of archetypical strategic situations such as the trust game, but is not associated
with a greater willingness to contribute in public good games.
If pro-social behavior is not acquired through education, the strong rela-
tionship observed in the data must arise from a di¤erent source. One possible
explanation for a strong education e¤ect relates to the specic public good used
in the experiment: The e¤ect of emission reductions is complicated by the inher-
ent long-term nature and complexity of climate change. Patience and cognitive
ability are therefore likely to matter. A number of empirical studies link cogni-
tive ability and its proxy, education, with lower discount rates when assessing
future costs and benets and with overall stronger forward-looking behavior by
individuals (Parker and Fischho¤ 2005, Bettinger and Slonim 2007, Kirby, Win-
ston and Santiesteban 2005). Other studies emphasize the lower cognitive cost
to abler individuals of making decisions in complex settings (Peters, Västfjäll,
Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco and Dickert 2006). Against the background of self-
reported income, another explanation is that education is a possible alternative
measure of income and wealth. Since both tend to be positively correlated
with cognitive ability (Banks and Oldeld 2007), this provides an additional
causal channel through which education could enter as a signicant explanatory
variable.
Environmental controls The sample of subjects taking part in the exper-
iment is drawn from all over Germany, introducing possibly important spatial
20Results are available upon request.
21Data speaks against multicollinearity of income and education as explanation for the
persistent insignicance of the one and strong signicance of the other: excluding education
or any other variable does not induce income to pick up an e¤ect (Correlation coe¢ cient 0.29).
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or structural determinants of behavior that are easily overlooked. At the same
time, situational factors may play a role in explaining observed variations in
contribution choices between subjects. We pursue two distinct strategies to ac-
count for these possibilities. One is to estimate the models with xed e¤ects for
location and time, exploiting the polling companys records on each panel mem-
ber and the time stamps recorded for each screen completed in the experiment.
The results of this exercise are reported in columns 3 to 5 of tables 5 and 6 in
the appendix. The main message of the results is to underscore the robustness
of the coe¢ cient estimates derived under simpler specications.
The other strategy we pursue is to examine the applicability to the ex-
periment of claims that the behavior in public goods settings may not only be
determined by cognitive processes. Konow (2010) and Kirchsteiger et al. (2006),
for example, are among recent papers that demonstrate that emotional states
or moodshave explanatory power in such settings. Kirchsteiger et al. (2006),
for example, engineermoods by exposing subjects to sadand happymovies.
Konow (2010) varies the emotional context by varying the recipient group in a
dictator game. Both nd impacts on contribution choices.
Our approach employs a di¤erent strategy, with results reported in columns
3 and 4 of tables 2 and 3: We exploit exogenously generated variations in the
decision environment of our subjects by drawing on regionally disaggregated me-
teorological data from the National Weather Service (DWD). We are specically
interested in outside temperatures present at or close to the time and location
of the individual experiment: Subjects perception of the salience of climate
change or moods related to climate change mitigation e¤orts may plausibly
be linked to such environmental conditions. Linking contribution choices and
temperature data in the subjects region of residence, we nd that the proba-
bility of contributing increases with ambient temperatures where temperature
is computed as the average of the mean temperatures on the day the subject
took the experiment and on the day before.22 More specically, we nd that
an increase of one degree centigrade in ambient mean temperature increases the
probability to contribute by around 0:4 percent. In relative terms, the marginal
e¤ect of one degree centigrade on the probability of contributing is therefore
four times that of a one Euro price decrease. Including media presence of the
topic of climate change alongside the temperature data does not appreciably
change this estimate.
While the results on situational factors may provide evidence on the presence
of a very di¤erent type of warm glowin our eld setting, there is the possibil-
ity that ambient temperatures either proxy for a di¤erent driver or that other
conventional drivers linked to temperature are present. For example, ambient
temperatures may simply proxy for latitude or similar spatial e¤ects. Includ-
ing latitude alongside the temperature variable marginally a¤ects the p-values
of coe¢ cient estimates,23 but does not alter the results otherwise. The e¤ect
of temperature may also be explained by other unobserved selection biases or
socioeconomic factors that make ambient temperatures particularly salient to
subjects, such as employment in the construction sector, even though the so-
cioeconomic data provides no further evidence for this hypothesis.
22The results also hold for daily temperature maxima and for a larger time window of 48
hours. These results are excluded for brevity and available from the authors.
23E.g. the p-value of the 24h temperature variable increases from p=0.031 to p=0.034.
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Benets Asking subjects to provide an ex post assessment of perceived bene-
ts from a public goods contribution chosen or not chosen may seem superuous
on the grounds of both theory and preference revelation. The ex post assessment
of stated benets, however, is useful for informing a broader behavioral model
determining choice between the alternatives.
We solicit statements on perceived personal and next generation benets
from all subjects in the experiment. The results reported in tables 2 and 3
are in line with expectations: A greater perception of total benets (personal
and next generation) increases the probability of contributing. What is of in-
terest, however, is the relative role of personal and next generation benets in
explaining contributions. Table 3 reports on the marginal impact of a one-unit
(response category) increase in both variables. A one-unit increase in next gen-
eration benets raises the probability of contributing by almost 5.0 percent.
The same increase in the expectation of personal benets, on the other hand,
increases the probability by 3.6 percent. The marginal e¤ect of the altruistic
motive at the sample mean is therefore one-and-a-half times as strong as that
of personal benets.
Negative contributions to the public good Subjects can make and usu-
ally will have made negative contributions to the public good under considera-
tion in this eld experiment: Carbon emissions are coupled to most economic
activities that subjects will be engaged in. If subjects rationally take into con-
sideration their negative contributions to the large-scale public good when mak-
ing the contribution decision in the experiment, the predictions regarding the
probability of contributing di¤er markedly from a model where they do not
(Vicary 2000). Following a closely related line of reasoning, Kotchen (2009) de-
rives the resultant demand for contributions to the public good that are driven
by a desire to o¤setsimultaneous negative contributions. These extensions of
the traditional model of private provision of public goods provide explanations
for contribution rates that exceed those predicted under conventional assump-
tions such as Andreoni (1988) and lead to a prediction that subjects with higher
negative contributions to the public good should have a higher probability of
contributing positively when provided with the opportunity.
Theories of o¤set are not the only possible explanation for a positive relation-
ship between acknowledged negative contributions and observed positive contri-
butions. Similar qualitative predictions can arise out of theories that consider
guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007) or shame (Andreoni and Petrie 2004) as
drivers. In both theories, perceptions of norms or expected behaviorplay a
role. If the amount of negative contributions exceeds a normative target level,
guilt or shame provide arguable reasons for deciding to contribute in the exper-
iment, given the opportunity. Theories of environmental o¤set, guilt and shame
jointly provide three possible reasons why lifestyle-related negative contributions
to the public good may matter for the contribution decision.
The experiment o¤ers subjects the opportunity to acknowledge a personal
negative contribution to climate change through two channels. One invites
subjects to rank on a scale of 1 to 4 the extent to which they believe their lifestyle
has contributed to climate change. The other asks subjects about a quantitative
estimate of their annual carbon footprint in tons of carbon. Tables 2 and 3 report
on the results of testing for evidence of negative contributions being a driver
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of contribution decisions: Carbon footprint estimates exhibit high noise and do
not return signicant results. Contribution ranks, on the other hand, are linked
to subjectscontribution choice in a positive and signicant way: An increase in
one rank is associated with an approximately four percent higher probability of
contributing. This acknowledgement e¤ectis in the same order of magnitude
as the perception of personal and future generation benets, with a quantitative
impact roughly at the same level as that of perceived private benets from a
contribution decision, but consistently smaller than that of perceived future
generation benets.
One exception to the acknowledgement e¤ect is a small group of subjects
(7.4 percent) who claim condence in their estimate of their carbon footprint.
As column 4 of tables 2 and 3 shows, the behavior of this group accounts for
the negative e¤ect of footprint condence on the probability of contributing
reported in column 3. Interacting footprint condence with the subjects con-
tribution rank we nd that this group is signicantly more likely to choose the
cash prize. Closer examination of this group reveals two important distinguish-
ing characteristics: On the one hand, members of this group tend to provide
footprint estimates that are more plausible than the average. On the other,
these subjects are readier to acknowledge their own negative contributions to
the public good. The negative e¤ect of the interaction of both characteristics
on the contribution choice could be due to a number of di¤erent reasons. One
possibility is that this small group consists of highly climate-conscious subjects
who believe to be already contributing to emissions reductions in a major way.
This could explain why we nd no acknowledgement e¤ect among this group.
3.3 Field price censoring or moral economy? - A test
Of the 2,440 subjects in the experiment, 2,058 choose the cash prize. The
experimental protocol for FPC directs these subjects to two ex post questions24
targeted at the reasons for choosing the cash prize. The questions sort subjects
into two groups: The one group consists of subjects that respond that given the
alternatives, the cash prize was strictly preferable to contributing to the public
good. This group makes up 72.7 percent of those choosing the cash prize. The
other group consists of subjects that declare that at the given experimental price,
they would make a contribution, but chose not to because they believe they can
make the same contribution to the public good at a lower price elsewhere. This
FPCgroup makes up 25.8 percent of subjects.
The key question is how to interpret the FPCgroup. Subjects selecting
into this group may indeed be eld price censored, in line with the design of
the ex post questionnaire (Coller and Williams 1999, Harrison et al. 2002, Cor-
rigan and Rousu 2008). A closer examination of the data cautions against
this interpretation, however: Column 1 of table 4 reports the results of a pro-
bit estimation that tries to explain the decision to declare FPC as a function
of plausible and observable drivers of arbitrage opportunities available to the
subject. Such drivers are the o¤ered cash prize, the subjects estimate of and
condence in the EUA price, knowledge about transactions costs, knowledge
about and condence in the individual carbon footprint, and the time a subject
24 In reality, there are three questions: two given and one free text. However, with the
exception of 116 subjects (cp. footnote 16), all free text answers provided paraphrases of the
given questions and could therefore be reassigned.
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takes to complete di¤erent screens, indicating either careful consideration or
active information acquisition.25 In addition, the model includes the subjects
socio-demographic characteristics. The model performs weakly in explaining
subjectsstatement for a number of reasons: Given the random assignment of
subjects to price treatments, the probability of the experimental price exceeding
the subjects perceived eld price strictly increases in the experimental price.
The model, however, estimates a decreasing e¤ect of the experimental price.
Secondly, subjectsprice estimate of the eld substitute should enter negatively
into the estimation. This price estimate is not directly observable, but is likely
to be correlated with subjectsperceptions of the EUA price and their carbon
footprints. While some of these proxies show the expected sign, none of them
provides a statistically signicant contribution to explaining why subjects sort
into the FPCgroup. Thirdly, variables on subjects time stamps also show
no signicant e¤ect. With the exception of education, which has an ambiguous
interpretation (see below), the arbitrage mechanism underpinning FPC lacks
support by the experimental data.
An alternative interpretation of the FPCgroup is the possibility that there
is moral economy at work that provides subjects with an incentive to declare to
be driven by FPC even when they are not. This possibility has been raised by
other scholars in the eld (Karlan and List 2007, Kahneman and Knetsch 1992).
Non-contributors to public goods may feel discomfort on account of their behav-
ior deviating from some notion of expected behavioror behavioral norm. Eco-
nomic theories of self-image or guilt (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007), for ex-
ample, consider norms imposed on oneself, economic theories of image (Benabou
and Tirole 2006) and shame (Andreoni and Petrie 2004) consider norms held
by peers or other individuals, often of a higher social standing, whose respect
matters to the subject. There may be subjects for whom the perceived behav-
ioral norm is that individuals ought to contribute to public goods unless doing
so is excessively costly. If such subjects choose the cash instead, the FPC l-
ter presents an opportunity to explain their decision to an outside observer as
motivated by objective cost-benet considerations rather than personal gain.
Column 2 of table 4 reports the results of a possible moral economymodel
that includes motivational variables. Once a notion of shame avoidance à la
Andreoni and Petrie (2004) is considered as a driver,26 the negative and sta-
25Evidence for information acquisition during the experiment, e.g. by searching the Internet
for EUA spot prices, comes from a careful examination of the time stamps of each screen in
each individual experiment. The time stamp measures the exact time at which the subject
moved on to the next screen. As information collection requires time for targeted search, search
activity should be associated with time delay at screens that ask for relevant information
relative to other screens. We impose ambitious assumptions on how quickly a subject can
collect the information: For example, subjects would need to nd EUA prices and information
on annual per capita emissions on the Internet in under 2 minutes while pilot data indicates the
average subject requires between 3 and 5 minutes to locate relevant information. We nd no
more than 1.4 percent of subjects with time delays that would be consistent with information
collection. In addition, these candidates do not exhibit above average accuracy on the factual
questions in the experiment. On this basis, we conclude that information acquisition does not
play a role in explaining the results. Importantly, this result also means that the eld-price
censoring observed is not a product of endogenous information acquisition by subjects during
the experiment, but can at most be generated by exogenous di¤erences in information.
26Among guilt, image and shame, shame has most theoretical traction in the present setting:
If subjects felt guilty for having chosen the cash, claiming in the follow-up questions to be eld
price censored when they were not, only compounds the previous deviation from expected
behavior with a subsequent untruthfulness. Image concern vis-a-vis a group of peers also
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Table 4: Arbitrage vs. morals: alternative explanations for declaring FPC
Arbitrage Moral Combined
(1) (2) (3)
Cash prize -0.0023* -0.0033** -0.0034**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
EUA price estimate (Te) -0.0046  -0.0112**
(0.004) (0.005)
EUA price condence 0.1430  0.1224
(0.129) (0.136)
EUAs available -0.0584  -0.0885
(0.090) (0.098)
Footprint estimate (Tt) -0.0026  -0.0008
(0.002) (0.002)
Footprint condence -0.0214  -0.0502
(0.144) (0.153)
Survey completion time -0.0001  0.0018
(0.000) (0.002)
Lottery screens completion time 0.0001  0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Personal benets  -0.2023*** -0.2117***
(0.054) (0.055)
Future benets  0.1398*** 0.1544***
(0.054) (0.054)
Negative contributions  0.2198*** 0.2205***
(0.048) (0.049)
Female -0.0641 -0.0249 -0.0224
(0.072) (0.080) (0.080)
Age 0.0062** 0.0064** 0.0060**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of education 0.0357*** 0.0327*** 0.0321***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Net income (Te) 0.0199 0.0165 0.0168
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Ambient temperature  -0.0067 -0.0060
(0.009) (0.009)
Constant -1.2601*** -1.6102*** -1.6171***
(0.201) (0.293) (0.299)
N 1602.000 1321.000 1311.000
Log-likelihood -893.933 -737.793 -725.181
2 36.562 62.051 70.985
Pseudo R2 0.020 0.040 0.047
Notes: Probit coe¢ cient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent
variable: 1 if sub ject declared that cheaper perceived outside opportunities pre-
vented the choice of the contribution (eld-price censoring). *** Signicant
at or below 1 percent ** Signicant at or below 5 percent * Signicant at
or below 10 percent
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tistically signicant coe¢ cient on the experimental price would be consistent
with the idea that those subjects have most to gain in moral terms from declar-
ing FPC who were o¤ered the lowest experimental price. This would be the
case if shame is higher the smaller the personal sacrice required for the pub-
lic good. The results on the motivational variables underline the importance
of declaring not to be motivated by personal gain: A more emphatic belief in
next generation benets of the public goods contribution and a greater acknowl-
edgement of negative lifestyle-related impacts on the public good increase the
likelihood of claiming to be FPC. This is consistent if subjects believe that the
expected behavior is to be more willing to contribute for public goods that
provide greater benets and to be willing to compensate the public for damages
imposed through own behavior. The converse also holds: Subjects that attach
personal benets to contributing to the public good would see less of a moral
dimension, feel less shame, and are therefore less likely to claim FPC, consistent
with the estimation results.
The last column of table 4 merges both models as a robustness check. The ex-
perimental price e¤ect remains negative and highly signicant. For the variables
related to the perceived eld price, the combined model identies a signicantly
negative e¤ect of the EUA price estimate, providing stronger evidence of a gen-
uine FPC component. While not consistent with a simplistic interpretation of
shame avoidance27 , the e¤ect is quantitatively weak.28 In addition, the caveat
that the subject provides its eld price estimate after passing the FPC lter
applies. The education and the age e¤ect are reconcilable with both models:
Education and age may be associated with better information about alternative
ways of providing the public good and hence give rise to genuine FPC. Alter-
natively, more highly educated and older subjects may be more acutely aware
of notions of expected behavior or be wealthier, both of which would increase
the moral gain for claiming not to be driven by personal gain. We test addi-
tional specications to check for interaction e¤ects between gender and price
of the type predicted by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and for shift e¤ects
that predict that male subjects are more likely to claim the hidden altruist
status (Brown and Taylor 2000). These tests fail to return statistically salient
results.29
4 Conclusion
The role of price and non-price e¤ects in explaining voluntary contributions to
public goods in a large economy remains an area of important debate among
economists. More empirical and experimental evidence is required in order
to assemble the building blocks for a more comprehensive theoretical model
of voluntary giving. In this spirit, we conducted a large-scale eld experiment
has limited traction here as there is no visibility of contribution decisions to other subjects.
Shame has the greatest traction since it combines the feeling of an objective standard of right
behavior with an authority gradient that makes the experimentor as only observer also the
implicit judge of the subjects behavior.
27A higher eld price should ceteris paribus be associated with more shame for not having
provided the public good when it was relatively cheap to do so.
28Note that the EUA eld price is measured in thousand Euros.
29Likewise, testing for interaction e¤ects of the experimental price with the remaining de-
terminants in the FPC model does not yield signicant results.
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with 2,440 subjects in which we exogenously vary the price of contributing to the
closest empirical counterpart to an innitely large public goods game, climate
change mitigation, while simultaneously observing a large number of possible
non-price determinants.
We nd that the price e¤ect is robust and negative, but quantitatively weak,
with a price elasticity of  0:25. The weakness of the absolute price e¤ect puts
the onus of explaining the evidence on non-price variables. These variables de-
liver in both expected and unexpected ways. Among socioeconomic variables,
education stands out as a key determinant. Keeping in mind the possible limita-
tions of self-reported income data and the lack of an established education-social
preference channel in the literature, the role of education could be due to both
cognitive and income and wealth e¤ects. For gender and age, on the other hand,
the literature provides reasons for expecting a signicant role, but gender and
age e¤ects fail to materialize in the experiment. Instead, situational variables
such as ambient temperatures around the time of the experiment are statis-
tically related to contribution decisions. Most importantly perhaps, variables
that can be plausibly linked to guilt and moral responsibility dominate the price
e¤ect.
The importance of non-price factors such as moral gain through contributing
is underlined by evidence that arises from the battery of questions originally
designed to detect eld price censoring: A di¤erent interpretation of the FPC
lter is that it o¤ers non-contributors a costless opportunity to claim that the
experimental design prevented them from revealing their truealtruistic nature
by setting the price of contributing too high. Contrary to the prediction of
a negative price e¤ect by the FPC hypothesis, we nd that the probability of
claiming to be a hidden altruistis higher the lower the experimental price. Our
favored interpretation of this nding builds on the notion of a moral economyin
which subjects compare expected and actual behavior. When giving is cheap,
the expected behavior is to give. Not giving when giving is cheap reveals a
person to be overly motivated by personal gain at the expense of the common
good. Subjects that choose the cash over the contribution when the contribution
is cheap therefore have most to gain in moral terms by claiming to be eld price
censored. This behavior lends further support to the direction and scale of moral
factors and is a useful point of departure for further work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Experimental screens
A.1.1 Welcome screen
Dear participants,
we would like to invite you to participate in two lotteries and to
answer some questions about CO2-emissions and climate change.
Your participation will take approximately ten minutes. In the
lotteries, you have the chance to win points worth up to a three-digit
amount in euros.
As usual, all your information will be treated condentially.
A.1.2 Citizenship screen
Of which country do you hold citizenship?
In case you hold more than one, please tick all applicable boxes!
(...)
A.1.3 Information screen
In the lotteries, you may choose between the following two prizes:
A cash prize in points
or
the reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton
How will the reduction of the CO2 emissions take place? We will
make use of a reliable opportunity provided by the EU emissions
trading system: We will purchase and delete an EU emissions al-
lowance for you. Emissions allowances are needed by power plants
and other large installations within the EU in order to be allowed to
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emit CO2. Since there is only a xed overall amount of allowances
in place, deleted ones are no longer available to facilitate emissions.
Emissions in Germany and other EU countries decrease by exactly
one ton through one deleted allowance.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not
matter for the e¤ect on the climate where CO2 emissions are reduced.
What counts is only total emissions worldwide.
In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of
about 5,000 participants. The following two lotteries may di¤er in
the prizes o¤ered as well as in the payo¤ procedures.
A.1.4 Decision screen
In this lottery, you have the choice between the two prizes listed
below.
 If you choose the cash amount and win, then the corresponding amount
of points will be transferred to your points account within the next few
days. All winners will receive a short notication email.
 The deletion of emissions allowances will, in this lottery, take place as a
collective order for all winners. For every winner who chooses the emissions
reduction one additional allowance will be deleted. Winners will receive
a short notication email containing a hyperlink to Heidelberg University
webpages where they can reliably verify the deletion.
Please choose now, which prize you prefer if drawn as
winner:
( ) The reduction of CO2 emissions by one ton through the deletion of one
EU emissions allowance
( ) 46 Euro30 in bonus points
A.1.5 FPC lter question
Please give now any particulars as to why you chose the amount
in euros. In order to do this, please tick all applicable boxes. Please
answer spontaneously.
( ) Given the two prizes, I did not want to forgo the chance of winning 46
euros.
( ) I assume that there is another possibility for me to reduce CO2-emissions
by one ton for less than 46 euros.
( ) There were other reasons as to why I chose the amount of euros, namely:
____
A.1.6 Introduction follow-up questions
Thank you. On the following pages we would like to ask you
some concluding questions.
30Example amount. The order in which the two prizes appeared was randomized.
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A.1.7 Follow-up questions
What is your estimate of the current market price for one ton of
CO2 in the EU emissions trading system?
____ euros
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I know the price
( ) Very sure
( ) Rather sure
( ) Rather unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I dont know
A.1.8 Follow-up questions
In this lottery, EU emission allowances are bought and deleted
by the organizer. Do you think that there exists a possibility for you
to personally buy and delete EU emissions allowances?
Options: Yes, rather yes, rather no, no, I dont know
Do you think you will personally benet from the positive e¤ects
of reduced CO2 emissions (for example from the mitigation of climate
change)?
Options: Yes, rather yes, rather no, no, I dont know
Do you think that future generations in Germany (for instance
your children and grand-children) will benet from climate change
mitigating CO2 emissions reductions that are carried out today?
Options: Yes, rather yes, rather no, no, I dont know
Do you think that your personal behavior or lifestyle has con-
tributed to climate change?
Options: Yes, rather yes, rather no, no, I dont know
A.1.9 Follow-up questions
What is your estimate of the yearly CO2 emissions caused by
your lifestyle?
____ tons
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I had the emissions calculated
( ) Very sure
( ) Rather sure
( ) Rather unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I dont know
30
A.1.10 Follow-up questions
Do you consciously act in a climate-protecting way? If yes, please
list some forms of behavior, decisions and measures through which
you have consciously contributed or are contributing to the reduction
of CO2 or other greenhouse gases (in keywords).
A.1.11 Enquiry of socio-demographic information if not on record
Please state your gender.
( ) male
( ) female
In what year were you born? ___
How many children under 18 live in your household? ___
A.1.12 Enquiry of socio-demographic information if not on record
What is your highest educational degree?
( ) Still in school
( ) Special-needs school
( ) Elementary secondary school (Hauptschule, 9th grade)
( ) Polytechnic school of the GDR (10th grade)
( ) Highschool (Realschule, 10th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college entrance qualication
( ) A-levels (12th or 13th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college (Diploma (advanced technical college), Bach-
elor, Master)
( ) University degree (diploma, magister, bachelor, master)
( ) Ph.D.
( ) Dropout
( ) No specication
What is the overall net income of the household that you live in?
( ) under EUR 500
( ) from EUR 500 up to EUR 1000
( ) from EUR 1000 up to EUR 1500
( ) from EUR 1500 up to EUR 2000
( ) from EUR 2000 up to EUR 2500
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( ) from EUR 2500 up to EUR 3000
( ) from EUR 3000 up to EUR 3500
( ) from EUR 3500 up to EUR 4000
( ) from EUR 4000 up to EUR 4500
( ) from EUR 4500 up to EUR 5000
( ) from EUR 5000 up to EUR 10000
( ) EUR 10000 and more
( ) no specication
A.1.13 Closing screen
Dear participant,
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. If
you are one of the winners, we will contact you by e-mail shortly.
B Additional estimation results
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Table 5: Additional variants of model 2 (probit coe¢ cient estimates)
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
C a s h p r i z e - 0 .0 0 3 9 * * * - 0 .0 0 4 8 * * * - 0 .0 0 4 7 * * * - 0 .0 0 4 6 * * * - 0 .0 0 5 2 * * * - 0 .0 0 4 2 * * *
( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 )
Demographics
Fem a le  0 .0 3 9 7 0 .0 4 2 1 0 .0 3 2 3 0 .0 3 0 9 
( 0 .0 8 4 ) ( 0 .0 8 4 ) ( 0 .0 8 5 ) ( 0 .0 8 7 )
A g e  0 .0 0 2 8 0 .0 0 2 9 0 .0 0 2 6 0 .0 0 1 7 
( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 )
Ye a r s o f e d u c a t io n  0 .0 5 5 5 * * * 0 .0 5 4 6 * * * 0 .0 5 8 5 * * * 0 .0 6 1 8 * * * 0 .0 4 8 3 * * *
( 0 .0 1 2 ) ( 0 .0 1 2 ) ( 0 .0 1 2 ) ( 0 .0 1 2 ) ( 0 .0 1 0 )
N e t in c om e (T e)  -0 .0 1 9 8 - 0 .0 1 8 9 - 0 .0 2 9 2 - 0 .0 3 3 0 
( 0 .0 2 4 ) ( 0 .0 2 4 ) ( 0 .0 2 5 ) ( 0 .0 2 5 )
Environmental controls
Am b ie n t t em p e r a t u r e  0 .0 1 6 9 * - 0 .0 0 2 9 0 .0 0 3 0 - 0 .0 1 7 4 0 .0 1 6 2 *
( 0 .0 1 0 ) ( 0 .0 1 4 ) ( 0 .0 1 7 ) ( 0 .0 2 7 ) ( 0 .0 0 9 )
M ed ia a t t e n t io n  -0 .0 0 1 4    
(0 .0 0 2 )
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
P e r s o n a l b e n et s 0 .1 4 6 4 * * * 0 .1 6 1 9 * * * 0 .1 6 0 8 * * * 0 .1 5 2 2 * * * 0 .1 6 6 0 * * * 0 .1 4 0 6 * * *
( 0 .0 4 8 ) ( 0 .0 5 6 ) ( 0 .0 5 6 ) ( 0 .0 5 6 ) ( 0 .0 5 8 ) ( 0 .0 4 9 )
Fu tu r e b e n et s 0 .2 1 0 9 * * * 0 .2 2 6 8 * * * 0 .2 2 4 2 * * * 0 .2 2 8 0 * * * 0 .2 2 8 3 * * * 0 .2 4 7 0 * * *
( 0 .0 5 5 ) ( 0 .0 6 3 ) ( 0 .0 6 3 ) ( 0 .0 6 4 ) ( 0 .0 6 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 8 )
N e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s 0 .1 6 3 3 * * * 0 .1 7 1 8 * * * 0 .1 7 4 3 * * * 0 .1 8 5 2 * * * 0 .1 7 4 4 * * * 0 .1 6 2 7 * * *
( 0 .0 4 8 ) ( 0 .0 5 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 6 ) ( 0 .0 5 7 ) ( 0 .0 5 0 )
Fo o t p r in t e s t im a t e (T t ) - 0 .0 0 2 7 - 0 .0 0 2 8 - 0 .0 0 2 7 - 0 .0 0 3 0 - 0 .0 0 3 0 
( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 )
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e - 0 .5 0 8 8 * * * - 0 .6 5 6 3 * * * - 0 .6 5 5 2 * * * - 0 .6 2 6 5 * * * - 0 .6 8 5 4 * * * - 0 .6 0 2 6 * * *
( 0 .1 5 2 ) ( 0 .1 8 1 ) ( 0 .1 8 2 ) ( 0 .1 8 4 ) ( 0 .1 8 9 ) ( 0 .1 6 1 )
E U A p r ic e e s t im a t e (T e) 0 .0 0 6 2 * * 0 .0 0 5 7 * 0 .0 0 6 1 * 0 .0 0 5 7 * 0 .0 0 6 5 * * 0 .0 0 6 4 * *
( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 3 )
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e 0 .2 5 0 5 * * 0 .2 6 7 8 * * 0 .2 7 7 6 * * 0 .2 4 7 5 * 0 .2 6 7 4 * 0 .2 3 6 0 * *
( 0 .1 1 6 ) ( 0 .1 3 4 ) ( 0 .1 3 4 ) ( 0 .1 3 7 ) ( 0 .1 4 0 ) ( 0 .1 2 0 )
E U A ava i la b i l i ty - 0 .0 0 7 0 - 0 .0 8 3 6 - 0 .0 7 7 6 - 0 .0 9 0 5 - 0 .0 7 4 7 
( 0 .0 8 3 ) ( 0 .0 9 6 ) ( 0 .0 9 6 ) ( 0 .0 9 7 ) ( 0 .0 9 8 )
S u r v e y c om p le t io n t im e  0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 5 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 5 
( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 )
Interaction terms
C a sh p r i z e *      
ye a r s o f e d u c a t io n
C a sh p r i z e *      
p e r s o n a l b e n et s
C a s h p r i z e *      
fu t u r e b e n et s
C a s h p r i z e *      
n e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s
C a s h p r i z e *      
fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e
C a s h p r i z e *      
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e *      
n e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e *      
fo o t p r in t e s t im a t e
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e *      
E U A p r ic e e s t im a t e
C o n s t a n t - 2 .2 2 9 7 * * * - 3 .1 5 9 5 * * * - 3 .1 4 3 7 * * * - 3 .2 7 1 8 * * * - 2 .8 3 3 0 * * * - 3 .1 7 7 3 * * *
( 0 .1 5 8 ) ( 0 .4 1 3 ) ( 0 .3 3 7 ) ( 0 .4 2 4 ) ( 0 .5 4 1 ) ( 0 .2 4 8 )
S e s s io n e¤ e c t s N o N o Ye s N o N o N o
D ay e¤ e c t s N o N o N o Ye s Ye s N o
D ay t im e e¤ e c t s N o N o N o N o Ye s N o
R e g io n e¤ e c t s N o N o N o N o Ye s N o
N 1 9 8 3 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 9 0 2 .0 0 0
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d - 8 4 4 .4 6 7 - 6 5 0 .0 1 8 - 6 4 8 .0 3 3 - 6 3 9 .5 7 7 - 6 2 5 .3 9 3 - 7 8 9 .8 8 3
2 1 6 2 .4 7 8 1 8 0 .7 8 3 1 8 4 .7 5 4 2 0 1 .6 6 6 2 3 0 .0 3 3 2 0 0 .1 2 4
P s e u d o R 2 0 .0 8 8 0 .1 2 2 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 3 6 0 .1 5 5 0 .1 1 2
A IC 1 7 0 8 .9 3 3 1 3 3 4 .0 3 6 1 3 3 0 .0 6 6 1 3 3 9 .1 5 3 1 3 4 6 .7 8 6 1 5 9 9 .7 6 7
B IC 1 7 6 4 .8 5 7 1 4 2 5 .4 5 8 1 4 2 1 .4 8 7 1 5 0 0 .4 8 6 1 6 0 4 .9 1 9 1 6 5 5 .2 7 3
Notes: D ep e n d e n t va r ia b le : 1 i f s u b j e c t ch o s e t h e c o n t r ib u t io n ov e r t h e c a s h aw a rd . S e s s io n e¤ e c t s  i s a n in d ic a t o r
va r ia b le a n d 1 i f t h e s u b j e c t t o o k t h e e x p e r im e n t in J u ly. D ay t im e e¤ e c t s  d e n o t e in d ic a t o r va r ia b l e s f o r t h e
fo u r t im e in t e r va l s 6 :0 0 - 1 2 :0 0 , 1 2 :0 0 - 1 8 :0 0 , 1 8 :0 0 - 2 4 :0 0 , a n d 0 :0 0 - 6 :0 0 a t w h ich t h e s u b j e c t s t a r t e d t h e e x p e r im e n t .
R e g io n e¤ e c t s  a r e d um m ie s f o r t h e s u b j e c t s r e s id e n t ia l s t a t e (B u n d e s la n d ) . S t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n t h e s e s . * * *
S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 1 p e r c e n t * * S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 5 p e r c e n t * S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 1 0 p e r c e n t
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Table 6: Additional variants of model 2 (marginal e¤ects)
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 )
C a s h p r i z e - 0 .0 0 0 9 * * * - 0 .0 0 1 1 * * * - 0 .0 0 1 1 * * * - 0 .0 0 1 0 * * * - 0 .0 0 1 1 * * * - 0 .0 0 1 0 * * *
( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 )
Demographics
Fem a le ( d )  0 .0 0 8 9 0 .0 0 9 4 0 .0 0 7 1 0 .0 0 6 6 
( 0 .6 3 8 ) ( 0 .6 1 8 ) ( 0 .7 0 5 ) ( 0 .7 2 3 )
A g e  0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 4 
( 0 .3 3 3 ) ( 0 .3 1 8 ) ( 0 .3 8 6 ) ( 0 .5 7 3 )
Ye a r s o f e d u c a t io n  0 .0 1 2 4 * * * 0 .0 1 2 2 * * * 0 .0 1 2 9 * * * 0 .0 1 3 3 * * * 0 .0 1 1 1 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 )
N e t in c om e (T e)  -0 .0 0 4 4 - 0 .0 0 4 2 - 0 .0 0 6 4 - 0 .0 0 7 1 
( 0 .4 0 6 ) ( 0 .4 2 7 ) ( 0 .2 3 4 ) ( 0 .1 9 4 )
Environmental controls
Am b ie n t t em p e r a t u r e  0 .0 0 3 8 * - 0 .0 0 0 6 0 .0 0 0 7 - 0 .0 0 3 7 0 .0 0 3 7 *
( 0 .0 9 1 ) ( 0 .8 3 7 ) ( 0 .8 6 2 ) ( 0 .5 1 9 ) ( 0 .0 5 6 )
M ed ia a t t e n t io n  -0 .0 0 0 3    
(0 .3 4 7 )
Climate change attitudes and beliefs
P e r s o n a l b e n et s 0 .0 3 4 6 * * * 0 .0 3 6 3 * * * 0 .0 3 5 9 * * * 0 .0 3 3 6 * * * 0 .0 3 5 6 * * * 0 .0 3 2 3 * * *
( 0 .0 0 3 ) ( 0 .0 0 4 ) ( 0 .0 0 4 ) ( 0 .0 0 7 ) ( 0 .0 0 4 ) ( 0 .0 0 4 )
Fu tu r e b e n et s 0 .0 4 9 8 * * * 0 .0 5 0 8 * * * 0 .0 5 0 0 * * * 0 .0 5 0 3 * * * 0 .0 4 9 0 * * * 0 .0 5 6 8 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 )
N e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s 0 .0 3 8 6 * * * 0 .0 3 8 5 * * * 0 .0 3 8 9 * * * 0 .0 4 0 8 * * * 0 .0 3 7 4 * * * 0 .0 3 7 4 * * *
( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 2 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 ) ( 0 .0 0 2 ) ( 0 .0 0 1 )
Fo o t p r in t e s t im a t e (T t ) - 0 .0 0 0 6 - 0 .0 0 0 6 - 0 .0 0 0 6 - 0 .0 0 0 7 - 0 .0 0 0 7 
( 0 .3 0 6 ) ( 0 .3 3 6 ) ( 0 .3 5 0 ) ( 0 .3 0 7 ) ( 0 .3 0 8 )
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e ( d ) - 0 .0 9 5 1 * * * - 0 .1 0 6 8 * * * - 0 .1 0 6 2 * * * - 0 .1 0 1 5 * * * - 0 .1 0 4 3 * * * - 0 .1 0 4 1 * * *
( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 ) ( 0 .0 0 0 )
E U A p r ic e e s t im a t e (T e) 0 .0 0 1 5 * * 0 .0 0 1 3 * 0 .0 0 1 4 * 0 .0 0 1 2 * 0 .0 0 1 4 * * 0 .0 0 1 5 * *
( 0 .0 3 6 ) ( 0 .0 7 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 9 ) ( 0 .0 8 0 ) ( 0 .0 4 6 ) ( 0 .0 3 2 )
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e ( d ) 0 .0 6 5 0 * * 0 .0 6 6 6 * 0 .0 6 9 1 * 0 .0 6 0 2 * 0 .0 6 4 0 * 0 .0 5 9 4 *
( 0 .0 4 7 ) ( 0 .0 6 9 ) ( 0 .0 6 0 ) ( 0 .0 9 8 ) ( 0 .0 8 3 ) ( 0 .0 6 9 )
E U A ava i la b i l i ty ( d ) - 0 .0 0 1 6 - 0 .0 1 8 3 - 0 .0 1 6 9 - 0 .0 1 9 4 - 0 .0 1 5 7 
( 0 .9 3 3 ) ( 0 .3 7 0 ) ( 0 .4 0 6 ) ( 0 .3 3 7 ) ( 0 .4 3 7 )
S u r v e y c om p le t io n t im e  0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 1 
( 0 .6 2 9 ) ( 0 .6 4 7 ) ( 0 .6 4 7 ) ( 0 .7 0 0 )
Interaction terms
C a sh p r i z e *      
ye a r s o f e d u c a t io n
C a sh p r i z e *      
p e r s o n a l b e n et s
C a s h p r i z e *      
fu t u r e b e n et s
C a s h p r i z e *      
n e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s
C a s h p r i z e *      
fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e
C a s h p r i z e *      
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e *      
n e g a t iv e c o n t r ib u t io n s
Fo o t p r in t c o n d e n c e *      
fo o t p r in t e s t im a t e
E U A p r ic e c o n d e n c e *      
E U A p r ic e e s t im a t e
S e s s io n e¤ e c t s N o N o Ye s N o N o N o
D ay e¤ e c t s N o N o N o Ye s Ye s N o
D ay t im e e¤ e c t s N o N o N o N o Ye s N o
R e g io n e¤ e c t s N o N o N o N o Ye s N o
N 1 9 8 3 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 6 0 0 .0 0 0 1 9 0 2 .0 0 0
L o g - l ik e l ih o o d - 8 4 4 .4 6 7 - 6 5 0 .0 1 8 - 6 4 8 .0 3 3 - 6 3 9 .5 7 7 - 6 2 5 .3 9 3 - 7 8 9 .8 8 3
2 1 6 2 .4 7 8 1 8 0 .7 8 3 1 8 4 .7 5 4 2 0 1 .6 6 6 2 3 0 .0 3 3 2 0 0 .1 2 4
P s e u d o R 2 0 .0 8 8 0 .1 2 2 0 .1 2 5 0 .1 3 6 0 .1 5 5 0 .1 1 2
A IC 1 7 0 8 .9 3 3 1 3 3 4 .0 3 6 1 3 3 0 .0 6 6 1 3 3 9 .1 5 3 1 3 4 6 .7 8 6 1 5 9 9 .7 6 7
B IC 1 7 6 4 .8 5 7 1 4 2 5 .4 5 8 1 4 2 1 .4 8 7 1 5 0 0 .4 8 6 1 6 0 4 .9 1 9 1 6 5 5 .2 7 3
Notes: M a rg in a l e ¤ e c t s e va lu a t e d a t t h e s am p le m e a n s . ( d ) d e n o t e s t h e m a r g in a l e ¤ e c t o f a n in d ic a t o r va r ia b l e .
D e p e n d e n t va r ia b l e : 1 i f s u b j e c t ch o s e t h e c o n t r ib u t io n ov e r t h e c a s h aw a rd . S e s s io n e¤ e c t s  i s a n in d ic a t o r
va r ia b le a n d 1 i f t h e s u b j e c t t o o k t h e e x p e r im e n t in J u ly. D ay t im e e¤ e c t s  d e n o t e in d ic a t o r va r ia b l e s f o r t h e
fo u r t im e in t e r va l s 6 :0 0 - 1 2 :0 0 , 1 2 :0 0 - 1 8 :0 0 , 1 8 :0 0 - 2 4 :0 0 , a n d 0 :0 0 - 6 :0 0 a t w h ich t h e s u b j e c t s t a r t e d t h e e x p e r im e n t .
R e g io n e¤ e c t s  a r e d um m ie s f o r t h e s u b j e c t s r e s id e n t ia l s t a t e (B u n d e s la n d ) . S t a n d a rd e r r o r s in p a r e n t h e s e s . * * *
S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 1 p e r c e n t * * S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 5 p e r c e n t * S ig n ic a n t a t o r b e low 1 0 p e r c e n t
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